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Abstract 
The article deals with enemy images in east and west and their 
historical invention. Connecting the reader to current controversies about 
“Muslim bans”, the article guides the reader through the nexus of power 
and knowledge with a particular emphasis on the discourse of 
Orientalism and Occidentalism.This type of discourse is retroactive, not 
only because of its ideological content;, it is in fact and quite directly 
retroactive. Above everything else, the idea that there are essential, 
unbridgeable differences between cultures and by extension human 
beings is simply false. This urge to identify us in strict opposition to 
others has to be resisted, firstly because it is a false polarisation and 
secondly because it negates the prospect of dialogue and sustainable 
peace.   
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 We other Spartans: Orientalism, Occidentalism 
 
and the enemy “other” 
Ancient Greece and contemporary wars 







Since antiquity, the Greco-Persian wars have been a source of 
innumerable dramas that have animated historians and philosophers 
all over the world. The locations of the battles—Salamis, Marathon 
and above all Thermopylae—evoke emotive and rather indelible 
images that chime with sentiments of pride and honour, heroism and 
sacrifice. Scholars of gender (see recentlyStrange, Gribb, Forth, eds., 
2014) have identified such emotions as quintessentially chauvinistic 
and “macho” and symptomatic of a flawed, patriarchal interpretation 
of history.Nevertheless, the Greco-Persian wars continue to fascinate a 
range of academics with a traditional view of antiquity and its ethos. 
In mainstream scholarship, this Greco-Persian dialectic has been 
primarily limited to warand not, for instance, to the intense cultural 
exchanges that created a common Greco-Persian space along the 
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Eurasian plane. Edward Said (1995) famously argued that these battles 
of antiquity laid the foundation of the thick archives of 
“Orientalism”which he defined as a systematic discourse that 
repeatedly misrepresented the “east” as inherently stagnant and 
inferior. As such, the wars between the Greek city-states and the 
Persian empire are limited to the continuous threat of the barbarian 
“other”, in this case personified by Persian emperors such as Xerxes 
who are typically depicted as ruthless tyrants. Conversely, the western 
“self” is likened to the civilised polis; to the ideal-type of the 
seemingly advanced polities governing the Greek city-states and in 
particular Athens.  
Several other scholars (see Adib-Moghaddam, 2013, Achcar, 2006, 
Jackson, 2005)have noted that comparably problematic differentiations 
function for politicians today. There are many contemporary examples 
to choose from: For instance, in his bid for the presidential candidacy 
of the Republicans in the United States, Donald Trump (2015) asked 
for a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States until [the] country's representatives can figure out what is going 
on.’As President, he has followed up his campaign pledge with 
executive orders banning individuals from Muslim majority countries 
such as Iran, Iraq and Syria from entering the United States. The 
former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (2006) spoke of the 
fundamental difference between barbarity and civilisation in various 
speeches about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To his mind these 
battles were ‘not a clash between civilisations’ but rather a ‘clash 
about civilisation’ which he defined as the ‘age-old battle between 
progress and reaction’ (ibid.).With no reference to the violence of the 
colonial order that Britain extolled, Blair linked extremism in the 
Muslim world to a long history of conflict and defiance: 
The roots of global terrorism and extremism are indeed deep. They 
reach right down through decades of alienation, victimhood and 
political oppression in the Arab and Muslim world. ... I am not 
qualified to make any judgements. But as an outsider, the Koran 
strikes me as a reforming book, trying to return Judaism and 
Christianity to their origins, rather as reformers attempted with the 
Christian Church centuries later. ... Under its guidance, the spread of 
Islam and its dominance over previously Christian or pagan lands was 
breathtaking. Over centuries it founded an Empire, leading the world 
in discovery, art and culture. The standard bearers of tolerance in the 
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early Middle Ages were far more likely to be found in Muslim lands 
than in Christian. ... By the early 20th century, after renaissance, 
reformation and enlightenment had swept over the Western world, the 
Muslim and Arab world was uncertain, insecure and on the defensive. 
... Muslims began to see the sorry state of Muslim countries as 
symptomatic of the sorry state of Islam. Political radicals became 
religious radicals and vice versa. Those in power tried to 
accommodate the resurgent Islamic radicalism by incorporating some 
of its leaders and some of its ideology. The result was nearly always 
disastrous. The religious radicalism was made respectable; the 
political radicalism suppressed and so in the minds of many, the 
cause of the two came together to symbolise the need for change. So 
many came to believe that the way of restoring the confidence and 
stability of Islam was the combination of religious extremism and 
populist politics. The true enemies became "the West" and those 
Islamic leaders who co-operated with them (ibid.). 
 
This account of the former Prime Ministerignores thatIslam as 
ideology (or Islamism) has several facets, even when it targets real 
and perceived western domination(Adib-Moghaddam, 2002).In fact, 
the forefathers of the Islamic current, luminaries such as Mohammad 
Abduh and Jamaladin Afghani were not anti-western per se. They 
criticised European imperialism for very valid reasons given that their 
countries were occupied and subjugated. But they mostly welcomed 
western culture, philosophy and freedoms. Even the Islamic revolution 
in Iran was not merely an Islamist anti-western event.Iranians voiced 
their grievances against the dependencies of the autocratic monarchy 
on western patronage. Their opposition was political and not merely 
religious.Moreover, Islamism in Iran is very different from the 
methods, ambitions and ideology of movements such as al-Qaeda or 
Daesh (or ISIS). But politicians such as Tony Blair tend to minimise 
complex political dynamics of the Arab and Muslim world to the 
appearance of Islamism as a reactionary, coherent and aggressive 
movement which is diametrically opposed to the “west” for no good 
reason. There is no account of British imperialism and the arbitrary 
delineation of the so called “Middle East” which was partially 
formalised in the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916.“Radical Islam” is 
presented as a reactionary malice that is a constant threat to the values 
of humanity as if it is simply “there” as the manifestation of evil. So 
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called “Muslim countries” are reduced to victims of a seemingly 
coherent ideology which developed, according to Blair, out of 
frustration and self-pity. This argument is very close to the thesis of 
Bernard Lewisin his book “What went Wrong” which has been largely 
refuted by scholars (see furtherQureshi and Sells, eds., 2003, Said, 
1997). The argument of Lewis (2002a) is almost identical to the 
reasoning of Blair:  
 
In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear that 
things had gone badly wrong in the Middle East—and, indeed, in all 
the lands of Islam. Compared with Christendom, its rival for more 
than a millennium, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and 
ignorant. The primacy and therefore the dominance of the West was 
clear for all to see, invading every aspect of the Muslim's public and 
even—more painfully—his private life (ibid.). 
 
In the build up to the Iraq war,this analysis of Lewis merged into a 
prescription for war. Democrats in the so called “Middle East”, Lewis 
(2002b) concurs with Blair, are looking to the “west” for liberation: 
 
Apart from Turkey and Israel, the two countries in the region where 
the governments are elected and can be dismissed by the people, most 
of the countries of the Middle East can be divided into two groups: 
those with what we are pleased to call friendly governments, and 
therefore increasingly hostile people who hold us responsible for the 
oppression and depredations of those governments, and, on the other 
hand, those with bitterly hostile governments, whose people 
consequently look to us for help and liberation. The most notable of 
these are Iraq and Iran. In countries under dictatorship, the political 
joke is often the only authentic and uncensored expression of political 
opinion. An Iranian joke, current during the campaign in Afghanistan, 
related that many Iranians put signs on top of their houses, in English, 
with the text: "This way please!" (ibid.) 
 
This depiction of a Muslim world in need of being “rescued” from 
radicalism was very useful for Blair, George W. Bush and their 
academic narrators to legitimate the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Their “reactionary Islam” became a convenient label to demonise a 
wide spectrum of enemies which had nothing to do with each other: 
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from the secular-Arab nationalist tyranny of Saddam Hussein, the 
puritanical-terror espoused by al-Qaeda and likeminded movements 
(such as Daesh today) to the Islamo-Shia revolutionary republic in 
Iran. As indicated, former US president George W. Bush (2002) 
framed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with similarly problematic 
themes such as civilisation, barbarity, us-versus-them, good versus 
evil etc. As he remarked in a central policyspeech during the build up 
to the Iraq war: 
 
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy -- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al 
Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al 
Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one 
very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in 
Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for 
chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al 
Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And 
we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime 
gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. … Terror cells 
and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different 
faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. 
And the United States military is capable of confronting both. … Like 
other generations of Americans, we will meet the responsibility of 
defending human liberty against violence and aggression. By our 
resolve, we will give strength to others. By our courage, we will give 
hope to others. And by our actions, we will secure the peace, and lead 
the world to a better day (ibid.) 
 
No scholar in their right mind would have subsumed disparate 
actors such as al-Qaeda and Iraq into one category. Several studies 
have exposed how the Iraq war in 2003 was built on two false 
premises (some have called it outright lies): First, the allegation that 
Saddam Hussein had WMD capability as outlined by the speech of 
Colin Powell at the United Nations in February 2003; and second,the 
mirage that Iraq and al-Qaeda were linked which was convenient to 
turn Saddam Hussein into a culprit of the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on 11 September 2001 (see further Fowler, 2015). 
Taken together these narrative strategies had the fundamental effect to 
signify the friend-enemy distinction between self and other (you are 
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either with us or against us as Bush put it). So it remains pertinent and 
politically urgent to ask how and why this fundamental, romanticised 
distinction between the “Occidental self” and the “Oriental other”has 
sustained itself for such a long time. Why is it still used as a source of 
“identity”, as a major ingredient in the making of problematic 
categories such as “east” and “west” which are not defined in terms of 
geography but coherent “civilisations” or “non-civilised barbarians”? 
These are some of the questions that I intend to discuss in this present 
research.  
 
History as myth 
The emergence of ideas, norms, and other cultural artefacts 
constituting mainstream “history” is always dependent upon the 
presence of authorities, “guild” historians who are qualified and 
sufficiently legitimated via institutions to write the history of the 
“self” and the “other”, to maximise difference and to legitimate 
violence. Tony Blair must have read some history books about Islam 
to come to the conclusions that I summarised above. I doubt that he 
read Edward Said or Noam Chomsky and their critical views about 
US foreign policy in West Asia and North Africa. At least, we can 
argue that the argument of Blair (and Bush) is diametrically opposed 
to the ideas of these scholars. There is then what we may call 
complicity of knowledge in the exercise of power.In other words, 
research, in particular in the social sciences and the humanities, can 
always also facilitate false perceptions about other people, and their 
politics and culture. As we have seen, Bernard Lewis agrees with a lot 
of the themes Blair flagged up and vice versa. They both share similar 
perceptions of the contemporary Muslim world, even if they don’t 
engage in a direct dialogue. 
Historians and other scholars have repeatedly succumbed to the 
temptations of state power and politicians have repeatedly used their 
arguments for nefarious purposes. Such historians act as narrators who 
redefine a particular period of time or event in relation to a fictive 
present. They inscribe a timeless element into their narration, as if 
what happens is both inevitable and of endemic endurance (e.g. radical 
Islam has always been the enemy of progressive values).They may be 
called “court historians” given their close-knit entanglementswith the 
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state. Perhaps unconsciously, Blair picked up this methodical 
mechanism when he linked the political violence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to a primordial and unchanging hatred of ideas such as 
democracy, freedom of speech and human rights. In his view, the 
“other” is portrayed as being ideologically blinded by decades of 
hatred, especially towards the United States. In this way court 
historians provided the fodder for the canons of antagonism towards 
the “other” which in turn leads to policy mistakes.  
Politicians such as Tony Blair see the world in terms of ideological 
conflict which is why their strategic conclusions tend to be 
fundamentally wrong. In the case of Blair this error in judgement 
becomes apparent when he repeatedly insinuated (2006) that Iran may 
bandwagon with al-Qaeda. ‘True the conventional view is that, for 
example, Iran is hostile to Al Qaida and therefore would never support 
its activities’, Blair argued.‘But as we know from our own history of 
conflict, under the pressure of battle, alliances shift and change. 
Fundamentally, for this ideology, we are the enemy’ (ibid.). For any 
serious student of the region, the idea of a strategic alliance between 
al-Qaeda and Iran seems uneducated, even ludicrous. But in the 
world-view of Blair it was a possibility. His “history” of the region 
informed a false reading of its realities. So with the benefit of 
hindsight, the disastrous consequences of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan should not come as a surprise. These wars were planned 
by decision-makers who were uneducated in the complexities and 
realities of West Asia and North Africa. Theyseemed to have read 
flawed books and listened tothe wrong advice.As indicated, the 
production of knowledge tends to be infected by ideological 
impurities. Policy-makers are ill-equipped to reach the less polluted 
areas of the social sciences. Hence they are more likely to become 
hostage to fortune and to be culprits in humanitarian disasters which 
affect the lives of millions of people, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
I have been dealing with history as myth with a particular emphasis 
on contemporary examples. In order to give my argument additional 
analytical depth, I would have to show that knowledge in the service 
of power is an ancient occurrence in human relations. The most 
prominent example and a good starting point for our analysis is 
Herodotus of Halicarnassus (Bodrum, modern day Turkey) 
differentiation of world affairs into the Greek speaking world and the 
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“barbarians” beyond these confines which has been regarded as the 
first prominent employment of a “tribal” method at the service of a 
particular political interest, i.e. in this case the pan-Hellenic 
unification of the warring Greek city-states against the Persian empire. 
Herodotus was not interested in signifying some grand clash between 
civilisation and barbarism, but without his prominent writings the 
figure of the “barbarian” as “other”would not have gained such 
prominence at quite an early stage of human history. And as we have 
seen, the “barbarian other” continues to figure prominently in 
successive clash scenarios until today, most recently in the rhetoric 
surrounding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Herodotus has been called the father of history by Cicero in the 
first century BC. Certainly, he assumed this title when History was 
institutionalised as a discipline in the modern University. Yet 
Herodotus’ historical tracts were not only systematic in analytical 
terms, they were also steeped in the Greek myths of the time. He did 
not manage to free himself entirely from the traditions surrounding 
him, from the Greek Gods and their tantalising myths. It was 
Thucydides who perfected the art of writing “objectivised” history at a 
later stage. Thucydides managed to record the Peloponnesian War 
without adopting Herodotus’ uncritical narrative style that mixed 
quasi-factual tale telling with fantasy and entertainment. These vices 
come to the fore in his descriptions of the Greco-Persian wars. It is not 
only that Herodotus writes in chapter 186 of the Histories that the 
Persian king Xerxes, the son of Darius, brought 5,283,220 men to the 
battles at Sepias and Thermopylae, who then fought 300 Spartans in a 
heroic battle in which the Spartan leader Leonidas distinguished 
himself as one of the most brave and brilliant military leaders in 
human history. The whole book is permeated by Greek mythology. 
Indeed, the battle at Thermopylae itself is presaged by the oracle of 
the Pythoness:  
 
For when the Spartans, at the very beginning of the war, sent to 
consult the oracle concerning it, the answer which they received from 
the Pythoness was, ‘that either Sparta must be overthrown by the 
barbarians, or one of her kings must perish.’ The prophecy was 
delivered in hexameter verse, and ran thus: 
 ‘O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon! 
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of  
     Perseus, 
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Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country  
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.  
He cannot be withstood by the courage of bulls nor of lions  
Strive as they may; he is mighty as Zeus; there is nought that  
     shall stay him, 
Till he have got for his prey your king, or your glorious city’ (Herodotus, 
1996, p. 595). 
 
The historical account of the events during the battle at Thermopylae 
follows the ‘prophecy’ of the oracle:   
 
So the barbarians under Xerxes began to draw nigh; and the Greeks 
under Leonidas, as they now went forth determined to die, advanced 
much further than on previous days, until they reached the more open 
portion of the pass. … Now they joined battle beyond the defile, and 
carried slaughter among the barbarians, who fell in heaps. Behind them 
the captains of the squadrons, armed with whips, urged their men forward 
with continual blows. Many were trampled to death by their own soldiers; 
no one heeded the dying. For the Greeks, reckless of their own safety and 
desperate, since they knew that, as the mountain had been crossed, their 
destruction was nigh at hand, exerted themselves with the most furious 
valour against the barbarians. 
By this time the spears of the greater number were all shivered, and 
with their swords they hewed down the ranks of the Persians; and here, as 
they strove, Leonidas fell fighting bravely, together with many other 
famous Spartans whose names I have taken care to learn on account of 
their great worthiness, as indeed I have those of all the three hundred. 
There fell too at the same time very many famous Persians: among them, 
two sons of Darius, Abrocomes and Hyperanthes, his children by 
Phratagune, the daughter of Artanes (ibid., p. 595). 
 
“Greek” heroism and steadfastness is juxtaposed here to Persian 
cruelty and disorganisation. Herodotus writes history from an 
obviously biased disposition, one that is constituted and necessitated 
by the politico-cultural zeitgeist enveloping him. So if Herodotus can 
be considered the father of history, it must follow quite logically that 
history as a discipline was born in myth and out of ideological 
considerations. The oracle, the idea of the 300 Spartans fighting a 
heroic battle against over 5 million Persians, all of this appears 
unacceptable to the critical mind. Herodotus’ Histories served the 
important purpose to narrate the imperial rivalry between Greece and 
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Persia, in favour of the former. However, from our contemporary 
perspective, we would consider Herodotus one of the first “organic” 
intellectuals who wrote in the service of a newly devised, confessional 
ideology. 
 The pan-Hellenist agenda thus signified—an early form of 
“identity politics”— was already introduced in 472 BC with the 
staging in Athens of Aeschylus’s play The Persians. The theme of the 
play focused on the effect on the Persian royal family of the news of 
the defeat of their armies in the battle of Salamis. Aeschylus was a 
veteran of the battle against the Persians at Marathon, so his 
representation of the Greeks as free, emancipated and chivalrous in 
contrast to the Persian king who is shown to be hubristic, decadent, a 
totalitarian master of slaves, had a very particular political function. 
Ultimately, the historicised narration of this period, facilitated by 
Herodotus and later on by Xenophon (ca. 430-354 BC) in his accounts 
of the “Ten Thousand”, was meant to solidify the boundaries between 
the newly established Greek “entity” and its equally imagined 
“Persian” competitor and to imprint this binary into the “public” 
consciousness. The theatrical performances had a similar purpose. 
Thus, the category “barbarian” became a marker of a fictitious 
identity, an ideological device to delineate the Greek-speaking world 
from the rest— not only from Persians but also from Lydians, 
Phrygians, Egyptians and others who were now disqualified by the 
emergent Hellenocentric discourse. The us-versus-them binary thus 
dispersed into the field of politics and society was also expressed 
through sexual allegories. A famous vase depicting the battle on the 
Eurymedian river in the early 460s BC, for instance, shows a Greek 
warrior advancing with an erect penis in hand towards a Persian who 
is bending over. An inscription on the vase identifies the Persian as 
“Eurymedon”, after the name of the river where Cimon won a battle 
against the Persians. Given that homosexuality was a socially accepted 
practice in the Greek speaking worlds (and in parts of Persia, 
contemporary Iran/Iraq), he may be considered one of the first “pin-
ups” exemplifying the sexually charged representation of the “other”: 
“Eurymedon” may be the first prominent victim of the licentious 
passions of history (see further Coleman and Walz, eds., 1997, Hall, 
1989, Harrison, ed., 2002, Isaac, 2004). 
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Occidentalism 
Some of these early reactions towards the “other” have been 
touched upon by Edward Said of course. As early as in Aeschylus’s 
The Persians and in The Bacchae of Euripides, he writes, 
 
a line is drawn between two continents. Europe is powerful and 
articulate; Asia is defeated and distant. Aeschylus represents Asia, 
makes her speak in the person of the aged Persian queen, Xerxes’ 
mother. It is Europe that articulates the Orient; this articulation is the 
prerogative, not of a puppet master, but of a genuine creator, whose 
life-giving power represents, animates, constitutes the otherwise 
silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries (Said, 1995, p. 
57, emphasis in original). 
 
Said investigates how this ‘Orientalist vision, a vision by no means 
confined to the professional scholar, but rather the common 
possession of all who have thought about the Orient in the West’, has 
constituted the discursive formation termed ‘Orientalism’ (ibid., p. 
69). From the depictions of Xerxes as the leader of the “barbarians” in 
Aeschylus’s The Persians to Mohammed’s location in the ‘eighth of 
the nine circles of Hell, in the ninth of the ten Bolgias of Malebolge, a 
circle of gloomy ditches surrounding Satan’s stronghold in Hell’ 
(ibid., p. 68) what Dante called the seminator di scandalo e di scisma 
in Inferno,to modern, “social-scientific” inquiries into the “Muslim 
mindset,” Said threads through the maze of often denigrating 
representations of the other “Oriental” by European and (at a later 
stage) US American scholars. 
At least since antiquity, the self-other delineation that Said 
emphasises has been strengthened from innumerable loci. It was not 
only the Greeks who started to rewrite their history, to concoct 
seemingly well cloistered “genealogical” territories, to invent their 
self in accordance with a set of myths. The Persians were equally 
adamant about their “special” status. For them anyone who did not 
believe in the fusion of cosmic, moral and political order, the precepts 
of Ahura Mazda (the Zoroastrian God) manifested in the Persian king 
of kings (shahanshah) was deemed “barbarous” and wicked; anarya 
or “other” as opposed to arya or “pertaining to ourselves” (see further 
Boyce, 1975 and Hartog, 1988). This attitude, expressing as it does an 
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undoubted sense of religiously endowed superiority, can be discerned 
from the cuneiform writings inscribed in the rock of a massive 
mountain 66 metres above ground level, the Bisitun or “place of gods” 
in old Persian which is situated in the Kermanshah area of today’s 
Iran. It exhibits a relief depicting Darius’ ascension to the throne of 
Persia, his triumph over his enemies, and his endorsement by Ahura 
Mazda and is supplemented by a large amount of accompanying text 
in the three main languages of the Persian empire: Babylonian, Old 
Persian, and Elamite: 
 
I am Darius the Great King, King of Kings, King in Persia, King of 
countries, son of Hystaspes, grandson of Arsames, an Achaemenian.  
Darius the King says: My father was Hystaspes; Hystaspes' father was 
Arsames; Arsames' father was Ariaramnes; Ariaramnes' father was 
Teispes; Teispes' father was Achaemenes. ... For this reason we are 
called Achaemenians. From long ago we have been noble. From long 
ago our family had been kings. ... By the favour of Ahuramazda I am 
King; Ahuramazda bestowed the kingdom upon me. ...  These are the 
countries which came to me; by the favor of Ahuramazda I was king 
of them: Persia, Elam, Babylonia, Assyria, Arabia, Egypt, (those) who 
are beside the sea, Sardis, Ionia, Media, Armenia, Cappadocia, 
Parthia, Drangiana, Aria, Chorasmia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Gandara, 
Scythia, Sattagydia, Arachosia, Maka: in all, 23 provinces. ... These 
are the countries which came to me; by the favor of Ahuramazda they 
were my subjects; they bore tribute to me; what was said to them by 
me either by night or by day, that was done. ... This is what I did in 
both the second and the third year after I became king. A province 
named Elam became rebellious. One man named Atamaita, an Elamite 
– they made him chief. Thereupon I sent forth an army. One man 
named Gobryas, a Persian, my subject – I made him chief of them. 
After that, Gobryas with the army marched off to Elam; he joined 
battle with the Elamites. Thereupon Gobryas smote and crushed the 
Elamites, and captured the chief of them; he led him to me, and I 
killed him. After that the province became mine. ... Those Elamites 
were faithless and by them Ahuramazda was not worshipped. I 
worshipped Ahuramazda; by the favor of Ahuramazda, as was my 
desire, thus I did to them.  
 
Superiority is claimed here both religiously, through the viceregency 
of the Zoroastrian god Ahura Mazda that Darius assumes as a source of 
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legitimacy, and ethnically, based on Darius’ obvious bias in favour of his 
“Persian” subjects. Those rebellious Elamites, whose chief Darius is said 
to have killed, were reproached primarily because they were amongst the 
few non-Iranian people during that period who did not accept Ahura 
Mazda as their God and who rejected, by implication, the sovereignty of 
Darius. In turn, those Elamites who yielded to Persian suzerainty were 
rewarded. Cuneiform tablets from Persepolis, the ancient capital of the 
Achaemenid kings, suggest how these “good” Elamites received wine 
and food and how they offered them to the Iranian divinities. In short: the 
anarya were incorporated into the ‘Persian’ narrative as long as they 
accepted the Irano-centric sovereignty expressed therein.  
Myth making, hierarchies, the privileging of the in-group (in this 
case “Persians”) against the out-group (non-Persians) in order to 
express an imperial claim is not a prerogative of a particular culture. 
The modalities of oppression, the idea of superiority, the power of 
subjugation all of which have been inscribed in the archives of what I 
called the “clash regime”, go very deep and are much more 
indiscriminate than it seems.1If one fails to account for the circularity 
of them, one risks overemphasising one form of hegemony over the 
other. In this case it has to be acknowledged, and captured 
analytically, that the ‘other’ existed for the Persians, or so it appeared 
to the imagination of the Persian kings and notables, whose 
relationship to their subjects was either hierarchical or immediately 
hegemonic.  
It is out of this period that a particular idea of Iran emerges. 
Especially during times of imperial competition, this idea tended to 
license a discourse that was formulated from within its confines, the 
ideational contours of which were rendered pseudo-authentic either 
through religious designations (e.g. Zoroastrianism), racial factors 
(e.g. Iran, land of the Aryans) or linguistic delineation (e.g., the 
“Pahlavi” script). Some of these sentiments are fused rather brilliantly 
in the shahnameh(Book of Kings) or namey-e bastan (the ancient 
epistle) written by Ferdowsi in the eleventh century. Alexander of 
Macedonia is presented here as the legitimate and eldest son of the 
                                                 
1. The term refers to a “regime of truth”, a socially invented discursive constellation, that 
suggests that there is an ongoing clash between ‘self’ and ‘other’ (or civilisations). It is true 
for those who believe in it, but upon closer inspection with a critical attitude it proves to be 
as factual as a mirage.   
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Persian emperor Darab (Darius). In other words, he is turned from 
conqueror to lost heir, from Macedonian invader, to Persian prince in 
a display of phantasmal ‘historical’ re-engineering. Ferdowsi, an 
ardent romantic and outstanding narrator, implies that a heroic figure 
like Alexander must have been Iranian, that this would explain his 
great success as a conqueror. So suggestive were Ferdowsi’s tales that 
they continue to function as a point of reference for many 
contemporary Iranian nationalists, who would emphasise that the 
shahnameh is almost entirely depleted of Arabic terms and that pre-
Islamic Persia is truly representative of the “Iranian-Aryan” spirit 
(Adib-Moghaddam, 2015). 
Simply because Ferdowsi heralded Iran’s pre-Islamic kings (shahs) 
does not mean that he was racially biased towards Iranians of course 
or even inherently anti-Arab despite his rather negative depiction of 
the Muslim invasion of Sassanid Iran. But he does reserve, with 
immense mythical and poetical vigour, a privileged position for the 
Iranian/Persian self that has been strong enough to function as an 
ingredient in the construction of Iranian identity until today. To link 
this paragraph to our previous argument: distinguishing the ‘self’ from 
the ‘other’ via historical concoctions was not the prerogative of 
Herodotus or Aeschylus. Such pronounced articulations of identity 
can also be discerned from narratives signifying the meaning of Persia 
or Iran, in many ways until today. None of this has turned the human 
condition into a perpetual “clash of civilisations” of course, but 
repeatedly into a war between brothers and sisters: it has created a 
bond of fraternity between “us” and “them” which is violently 
interdependent.       
 
Thermopylae today 
The reification of the “other” from all sides indicates why 
contemporary adherents to the idea of a clash haverecourse to an  
ideationally diverse and historically "deep" regime of truth. We can 
know assess better why Tony Blair could claim with immense 
authority that there is a deep-rooted problem in the Muslim world and 
that we are embroiled in some“clash for civilisation” (by implication 
against the uncivilised “other”). A discourse such as this reinvigorates 
the early antecedents of the clash regime; it persistently organizszses 
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an archive, in which what matters is primarily identities, and 
permanent cultures, with all their claims to causality and “objective” 
validity. From this perspective, at least since the Persian-Greek wars 
at Marathon, Salamis and above all Thermopylae, history is the field 
of identity production and myth-making. That there is enough material 
to choose from accentuates the salience of the regime of truth thus 
constituted.  
     No regime of truth could function without the empirical 
inference of an archive. The power of the clash regime emanates from 
the salience of its constitutive discourses which are “thickened” via 
innumerable narratives situated within that socially engineered 
constellation. The particular talent of the clash disciples today is to 
mould these discourses together into a historical teleology. They are 
aided by the way history has been written in this regard. In other 
words, the regime of truth sustaining the clash regime today seems to 
emerge from “everywhere”, out of the innumerable narratives 
accentuating exclusion which are scattered around the archives of human 
thought and practice, because a whole range of prominent poets, 
writers, academics and other elite groups have not suggested 
otherwise. The fact that Herodotus’assertion that at Thermopylae, a 
tiny Greek holding force fought a heroic battle against over five 
million Persians could be picked up by Lord Byron (1788-1824) in a 
poem written in protest of Turkish occupation of Greece in the 19th 
century is yet another indicator for the structural continuities I am 
alluding to: 
The mountains look on Marathon— 
And Marathon looks on the sea; 
And musing there an hour alone, 
I dreamed that Greece might still be free; 
For standing on the Persians’ grave, 
I could not deem myself a slave. 
 
A King sate on the rocky brow 
Which looks o’er sea-born Salamis; 
And ships, by thousands, lay below, 
And men in nations;—all were his! 
He counted them at break of day— 
And, when the Sun set, where were they? 
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And where are they? and where art thou, 
 
My Country? On thy voiceless shore 
 
The heroic lay is tuneless now— 
 
The heroic bosom beats no more! 
 
And must thy Lyre, so long divine, 
 
Degenerate into hands like mine? 
 
 ‘T is something, in the dearth of Fame, 
 
Though linked among a fettered race, 
 
To feel at least a patriot’s shame, 
 
Even as I sing, suffuse my face; 
 
For what is left the poet here? 
 
For Greeks a blush—for Greece a tear. 
 
Must we but weep o’er days more blest? 
 
Must we but weep o’er days more blest? 
Must we but blush?—Our fathers bled. 
Earth! render back from out thy breast 
A remnant of our Spartan dead! 
Of the three hundred grant but three, 
To make a new Thermopylæ! (in Coleridge, ed., 2006) 
 
That the myth-making apparatus in antiquity (e.g. Herodotus), 
could be carried over throughout the centuries (e.g. by Lord Byron), 
and continues to make inroads into contemporary culturethrough 
Hollywood blockbusters like300, is yet another indicator forthe 
structural linkages at stake here.1 The myth of Thermopylae, or what 
Edgar Allan Poe called “the Glory that was Greece”, has travelled a 
                                                 
1. The movie 300(2006). produced by Zack Snyder and based on the graphic novel of Frank 
Miller provoked protests from many quarters in Iran and beyond. The movie was criticized 
for depicting Persians as ‘bloodthirsty, underdeveloped zombies’ feeding into ‘racist 
instincts in Europe and America’. Other film critics described it as ‘a textbook example of 
how race-baiting fantasy and nationalist myth can serve as an incitement to total war.’ See 
further Gary Leupp, ‘A racist and insulting film: 300 vs. Iran and Herodutus’, 
Counterpunch, Weekend Edition, March 31/ 1 April 2007. 
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long way: It can be found in a famous “rebel” poem entitled ‘A Nation 
Once Again’ written by the Irish nationalist Thomas Osborne Davis 
(1814-1845); it was taught in the British public school system since 
Victorian times and well into the twentieth century; it appears in the 
novels of Charles Dickens (The Mystery of Edwin Drood, 1870), 
Edward Bulwer Lytton (Pausanias, the Spartan, 1873) and Steven 
Pressfield (Gates of Fire, 1998); it fed into Nazi race theories on the 
one side and Greek resistance to Mussolini’s attempt to occupy 
Greece in 1940-1941 on the other; and it inspired anti-Soviet 
propaganda movies produced by Hollywood most vividly exemplified 
by the Cinemascope film The 300 Spartans (1962) which depicted, 
rather typically for this particular genre, the independent Greek city-
states as ‘the only stronghold of freedom remaining in the then known 
world’ (viz. the United States), holding out against the ‘slave empire’ 
of the Persians (viz. the Soviet Union).  
But we have to intervene in our argument here. The myth of 
Thermopylae has had a rather more central function for the discourse 
of the “west” and the pronounced will to signify hegemony contained 
therein, than the “glory of Persepolis” has had for the discourse of Iran 
or some “Orient”. The Persian empire never signified the meaning of 
the Orient in Asia, in the way that Thermopylae functioned for the 
concoction of a “western civilisation”.This nationalist narrative of Iran 
that is premised on the mythification of the Achaemenid kings, their 
Aryan ideal-type, the narrative style of the shahnameh etc. never 
really developed a systematic “anti-western” connotation, or any 
ideological vigour that would signify the “East” in its entirety. Rather, 
during the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) in the twentieth 
century and in many ways before, it served to delineate the “Persian 
self” from the “Arab-Muslim other” and to signify Iran’s supposed 
natural affinity with Europe and its “Indo-European” syntax. There 
was immense “Occidentalist” breeding ground for such narratives to 
gain currency amongst the elites of the country, a whole range of 
nationalist myths which have survived throughout the centuries and 
which have been repeatedly tapped into in order to define, somewhat 
metaphysically, the national narrative in Iran. The Pahlavi monarchs 
were fascinated by the imperial history of pre-Islamic Persia, and 
found its historical vigour conducive to legitimate their rule. To that 
end, they invoked the myth that their dynasty was somehow related to 
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Xerxes, Cyrus and Darius, the legendary Kings of the Achaemenid 
Empire. Thus, Mohammed Reza Shah adopted the official title 
aryamehr or light of the Aryans, celebrated 2,500 years of Iranian 
monarchy in a lavish festival in Persepolis in 1971 and subsequently 
abandoned the Islamic solar hegra calendar in favour of an imperial 
one, suddenly catapulting Iran into the year 2535 (based on the 
presumed date of the foundation of the Achaemenid dynasty). In the 
imagination of the shah this was the beginning of a new era for Iran, 
an era that was meant to set the country apart from its Islamic heritage 
fast forwarding it to the gates of a “great civilisation” (tamadon-e 
bozorg) (see further Adib-Moghaddam, 2006, 2009). 
 
Off just wars and unjust consequences 
Out of the politicians listed in this article only Tony Blair, rather 
reluctantly, and Colin Powell somewhat under duress, admitted that 
mistakes were made, in particular with reference to the Iraq war. 
Learning the lesson from the period of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq requires reminding ourselves about the nexus between power and 
knowledge that propelled these conflicts forward. I had already listed 
Bernard Lewis and his adherence to the war narrative, but there are 
many more examples. For instance, several scholars likened the “war 
on terror” to the just war principles of Augustine. In this regard, for 
the IR scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain (2003, p. 49),‘ideas about the 
dignity of the human person are central to American democracy 
because they flow directly from the religiously shaped commitment of 
Americans’.Elshtain, together with Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. 
Huntington, signed a letter (in Roberts, 2005, p. 27) in the aftermath 
of 9/11 rendering that link between just war theory and the so called 
“war on terrorism” explicit: 
 
The primary moral justification for war is to protect the innocent 
from certain harm. Augustine, whose early fifth-century book, The 
City of God is a seminal contribution to just war thinking, argues 
(echoing Socrates) that it is better for the Christian as an individual to 
suffer harm rather than to commit it. But is the morally responsible 
person also required, or even permitted, to make for other innocent 
persons a commitment to non self-defense? For Augustine, and for the 
broader just war tradition, the answer is no. If one has compelling 
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evidence that innocent people who are in no position to protect 
themselves will be grievously harmed unless coercive force is used to 
stop an aggressor, then the moral principle of love of neighbour calls 
us to the use of force. 
 
From this perspective, the ultimate justification of the right to wage 
war, first in Afghanistan in 2001 and then in Iraq in 2003, is that it is 
meant to have an ordering effect, that it “civilises” international 
society, and that it ratifies the fundamental distinction between friend 
and enemy: If this “polis” is once again threatened by “savage 
barbarians” as 9/11 showed, if international politics is in a state of 
anarchy as theorists of IR argue, it is necessary to pacify that system 
in order to secure the future of civilisation. 
The complicity of knowledge in the machinations of power should 
be evident by now. Apart from implicit nods to the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, there were also very direct linkages between the 
argument of scholars and central policy speeches by leading members 
of the Bush administration, for instance when the former US Vice 
President Cheney referred to the late Fouad Ajami to refute scepticism 
about the ability of the United States to manage Iraq after the 
invasion. According to Cheney (Full Text of Dick Cheney’s speech, 
2002, emphasis added): 
Another argument holds that opposing Saddam Hussein would 
cause even greater troubles in that part of the world, and interfere with 
the larger war against terror. I believe the opposite is true. Regime 
change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. 
When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving 
peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that 
can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab "street," the 
Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after 
liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are "sure to erupt in joy 
in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans." 
Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. 
Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to 
advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just 
as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The reality is that 
these times bring not only dangers but also opportunities. In the 
Middle East, where so many have known only poverty and 
oppression, terror and tyranny, we look to the day when people can 
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live in freedom and dignity and the young can grow up free of the 
conditions that breed despair, hatred, and violence. ... With our help, a 
liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural 
resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a 
peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has 
territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a 
nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are 
recognized and protected. In that troubled land all who seek justice, 
and dignity, and the chance to live their own lives, can know they 
have a friend and ally in the United States of America. Great decisions 
and challenges lie ahead of us. Yet we can and we will build a safer 
and better world beyond the war on terror.  
Here we find the familiar themes that have guided this article. The 
United States is portrayed as the purveyor of freedom and justice. 
Conversely, the “other” is deemed to be incapable, troubled and 
underdeveloped. Cheney quotes Ajami to give his argument more 
analytical weight. The nexus between knowledge and power is 
apparent here. Comparable to Lewis and Huntington, Ajami was a 
trusted source of the neoconservatives in the United States who 
underwrote the so called “war on terror” and the Presidency of George 
W. Bush. It should not come as a surprise then, that Ajami was also an 
adherent to the clash idea. As he wrote in 2008 (The Clash): 
Nearly 15 years on, Huntington’s thesis about a civilizational clash 
seems more compelling to me than the critique I provided at that time. 
In recent years, for example, the edifice of Kemalism has come under 
assault, and Turkey has now elected an Islamist to the presidency in 
open defiance of the military-bureaucratic elite. There has come that 
“redefinition” that Huntington prophesied. To be sure, the verdict may 
not be quite as straightforward as he foresaw. The Islamists have 
prevailed, but their desired destination, or so they tell us, is still 
Brussels: in that European shelter, the Islamists shrewdly hope they 
can find protection against the power of the military. ... Huntington 
had the integrity and the foresight to see the falseness of a borderless 
world, a world without differences. (He is one of two great intellectual 
figures who peered into the heart of things and were not taken in by 
globalism’s conceit, Bernard Lewis being the other.) 
It continues to be primarily in the “western” discourse that the 
imperial competition between Persia and the Greek city-states has 
been turned into an artificial cultural and civilisational marker 
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between “east” and “west”. It was this imperial rivalry, in other words, 
that created the historical archives forthe idea of some “clash of 
civilisations” in the so called “west”its conceptual framework around 
notions of us-versus-them, its paradoxical emphasis on total 
difference, its imagination of fixed identities, its objectifying ideology 
and deceptive cultural coherence.The reason why it is possible for 
politicians and academics to replant this idea in the 20th century and 
for their argument to gain such prominence is exactly because it was 
nurtured within this regime of truth that has been located in those real 
and imagined early encounters. The idea of a “clash of civilisations” 
or a battle between civilisation and barbarity is nourished and 
sustained by this circulation of myths and their institutionalisation. 
This regime—de-central, heterogeneous, yet structurally salient—has 
accustomed the general public to accept demarcations between “us” 
and “them” as a way of introducing order especially during periods of 
crisis and upheaval (such as after 9/11).  
Herodotus was certainly not a fanatic or an extremist. He should be 
somewhat shielded from being drawn together with contemporary 
polemicists and their rather more sophisticated methods. By far more 
divisive than the polemicists of the ancient and medieval period, 
contemporary proponents of the clash regime avoid drawing things 
together by, circumventing possibilities of kinship, attraction and 
affinity. Their argument israther dependenton discrimination, that is, 
on an epistemology that accentuates conflict with the “other”, who is 
thought to be absolutely detached from the “self”.By necessity of its 
exclusionary demeanour,this type of discourse simulates boundaries, 
contracts the various forms of the other, erects total systems instead of 
hybrid structures, produces deceptive binaries: Orient versus 
Occident, barbarian versus civilised, west versus Islam, European 
versus Muslim (see further Adib-Moghaddam, 2013). This type of 
discourse is retroactive, not only because of its ideological content; it 
is in fact and quite directly retroactive.Above everything else, the idea 
that there are essential, unbridgeable differences between cultures and 
by extension human beings is simply false. This urge to identify us in 
strict opposition to others has to be resisted, firstly because it is a false 
polarisation and secondly because it negates the prospect of dialogue 
and sustainable peace.  
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